mercredi 30 décembre 2015

vendredi 13 novembre 2015

keynes the stock market investor

http://nowandfutures.com/large/KeynesTheStockMarketInvestorSSRN-id2023011.pdf

In a memorandum in May of 1938, Keynes offered the best summing up of his own philosophy: 
1. careful selection of a few investments (or a few types of investment) based on their cheapness in relation to their probable actual and potential intrinsic value over a period of years ahead and in relation to alternative investments; 
2. a steadfast holding of these investments in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for several years, until either they have fulfilled their promise or it has become evident that their purchase was a mistake; and 
3. a balanced investment position, that is, a portfolio exposed to a variety of risks in spite of individual holdings being large, and if possible, opposed risks. 
Here is one last bit of advice from the same memo: 
In the main, therefore, slumps are experiences to be lived through and survived with as much equanimity and patience as possible. Advantage can be taken of them more because individual securities fall out of their reasonable parity with other securities on such occasions, than by attempts at wholesale shifts into and out of equities as a whole. One must not allow one’s attitude to securities which have a daily market quotation to be disturbed by this fact.

vendredi 28 août 2015

mercredi 8 juillet 2015

Mapping the U.S. By property value

http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/07/mapping-the-us-by-property-value-instead-of-land-area/397841

mardi 7 juillet 2015

Profits Without Prosperity

The allocation of corporate profits to stock buybacks deserves much of the blame. Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period those companies used 54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their earnings. That left very little for investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for employees.

https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity

Why is finance so complex

The analogy I would choose is finance as placebo. Financial systems are sugar pills by which we collectively embolden ourselves to bear economic risk. As with any good placebo, we must never understand that it is just a bit of sugar. We must believe the concoction we are taking to be the product of brilliant science, the details of which we could never understand. The financial placebo peddlers make it so.

http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/2669.html

mardi 30 juin 2015

Klarman on 1999 market level

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865827/000107261399000039/0001072613-99-000039.txt

TLDR For one thing, the financial markets have been so strong for so long that fear of market risk has mostly evaporated. People who used to hold bank certificates of deposit now maintain a portfolio of growth stocks. It is not really within human nature to comprehend that you may not know everything you think you know, and, further, that what you believe in could change on a dime. 
When your investments are backstopped by reasonably-priced tangible assets, the prospect of a change in sentiment is not very costly. If a building is no longer needed as a furniture retailer, maybe it would make a good warehouse. If you can't make money as a distributor, you can recover most of your capital by reselling your inventory.  

mardi 23 juin 2015

lundi 22 juin 2015

1987 lou simpson interview & checklist

http://www.berichcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/lou-simpson-1987-profile.pdf

According to Simpson, his investment principles are as follows:
(a) Think Independently. "We try to be skeptical of conventional wisdom and try to avoid the waves of irrational behaviour and emotion that periodically engulf Wall Street. We don't ignore unpopular companies. On the contrary, such situations often present the greatest opportunities."
(b) Invest in High-Return Businesses Run for the Shareholders. "Over the long run appreciation in share prices is most directly related to the return the company earns on its shareholders' investment. Cash flow, which is more difficult to manipulate than reported earnings, is a useful additional yardstick.

Brooklyn investor on Brookfield asset management

http://brooklyninvestor.blogspot.ca/2015/06/brookfield-asset-management-bam.html

mardi 12 mai 2015

Bill gates & Warren Buffet going back to school

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uChKXkhSMHc

Bill gates on the woodstock of capitalism

http://www.gatesnotes.com/About-Bill-Gates/50-Years-of-Warrens-Wisdom?WT.mc_id=05_12_2015_WarrensWisdom_tw&WT.tsrc=Twitter

l'ineptie fordiste

http://www.contrepoints.org/2014/12/22/191960-lineptie-fordiste

Lorsqu’il est question du niveau des salaires, la gauche fait souvent référence au fordisme. Le mythe veut qu’Henry Ford ait délibérément haussé les salaires de ses ouvriers pour que ceux-ci puissent avoir les moyens de s’acheter un modèle T, ce qui moussa la demande du produit et assura le succès de Ford. Comme l’explique Hadrien Gournay ici, cette vision du fordisme est une ineptie.
La réalité est que les hausses de salaires octroyées par Ford furent justifiées par une hausse fulgurante de la productivité résultant de l’implantion du taylorisme dans ses usines. En fait, cette augmentation des salaires avait pour but principal de lutter contre le taux de roulement devenu de plus en plus élevé avec l’apparition du travail à la chaîne, qui rendait le travail monotone. Ford a donc utilisé une part des gains de productivité découlant du taylorisme pour inciter ses employés à ne pas démissionner en raison de tâches répétitives et moins intéressantes. L’économie des années 1920s était en forte croissance, donc les opportunités d’emplois alternatifs ne manquaient pas pour ces ouvriers. Ford devait donc mieux rémunérer ses employés pour les garder.
L’autre part des gains de productivité a servi à diminuer le coût de production (et le prix) du modèle T à un niveau où de plus en plus de gens – et pas seulement les employés de Ford – avaient les moyens de se le procurer. C’est cela qui réellement a moussé la demande pour le produit. Avec les volumes accrus viennent les économies d’échelle et la hausse substantielle des profits…c’est ça la vraie recette du fordisme.

lundi 11 mai 2015

Cumulative advantage in a social world


This setup let us test the possibility of prediction in two very direct ways. First, if people know what they like regardless of what they think other people like, the most successful songs should draw about the same amount of the total market share in both the independent and social-influence conditions — that is, hits shouldn’t be any bigger just because the people downloading them know what other people downloaded. And second, the very same songs — the “best” ones — should become hits in all social-influence worlds. 
What we found, however, was exactly the opposite. In all the social-influence worlds, the most popular songs were much more popular (and the least popular songs were less popular) than in the independent condition. At the same time, however, the particular songs that became hits were different in different worlds, just as cumulative-advantage theory would predict. Introducing social influence into human decision making, in other words, didn’t just make the hits bigger; it also made them more unpredictable.

Marc Andreessen’s plan to win the future.

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/18/tomorrows-advance-man

lundi 27 avril 2015

some cool companies I discovered at techday

https://pymetrics.com/ ---> neuroscience applied to hiring

http://www.t3interactive.com/#about ---> a kinect software to help with presentation

https://smartvisionlabs.com/  ---> a new way to check your vision

http://www.amperic.com/ ---> a smart detector for water leaks

Biomeme --> dna smapling with an iphone


The companies are paying up for the drugs whose prices they raise

http://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-companies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-prices-1430096431

Bronte capital on fraud in china

http://www.brontecapital.com/files/amalthea/Amalthea_Letter_201503.pdf

mercredi 15 avril 2015

mercredi 21 janvier 2015

the political consequences of poor economics

http://blogs.ft.com/andrew-smithers/2015/01/the-political-consequences-of-poor-economics/?

TLDR :Realism seldom offers the instant gratification sought by the disgruntled, and populist policies thus usually represent a retreat from reason rather than a rise in analytical rigour. When countries have embraced populism, the resulting policies have habitually made matters worse.

mardi 20 janvier 2015

Book review & analysis The Education of a Value Investor

Book review & analysis The Education of a Value Investor by Guy Spier,

The book start out with an interesting analysis of how top educated hardworking people end up working on the edge of legality, pushed by a culture of performance at all price.

It then goes on exploring the many fallacies one must face in school. How students adapt to perform in that closed environment, where everything is black or white. And it explore why that can translate to fatal mistake in the real world where everything tend to be grey.

He follows up with a quite humble tale of his "classic" transformation( from Graham -->Buffet, Munger) and disclose how his father got him started.

Where I think the book gets really interesting is when he starts talking about bias. He doesn't stop at just vomiting Daniel Kahneman or Dan Ariely research such as how we perceive loss, our limited "willpower", the herd mentality or how we usually stick with our first idea. He actually explain how he implemented contermeasure to those bias.

Acknowledging he's not rational he explain how he set up his work environment to minimize bias. Moving away from NYC, forgetting about daily stock price movement, using a standing desk, naping, information reading order, the use of a checklist, taking responsibility for mistakes and surrounding by the right people.

I will delve on the last point as I think it's the most important. First I think our gregarious instinct push us to seek constant reinforcement from our social environment. During period of intense stress such as the last financial crisis like minded people make it easier to stand against your investor and your own mind allowing the opportunity to buy when everyone is fearful. And second, we actually become who we spend time with, I firmly believe in a simple rule of thumb, we're the average of our five closest friend. As Guy explain, choose them wisely.

The last part but not the least is about balance. Don't take it too seriously, enjoy what you do stay in shape and spread love around you. Because the ultimate score for success is love.

It's a well edited and entertaining book with plenty of reference for someone that wants to dive deeper( I appreciate authors who take the time to disclose their library).

Vincent






 

Awsome data visualisation on markov chains & central limit theorem

http://setosa.io/#/

16 lessons from walter schloss

http://www.valuewalk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Walter-Schloss-1.png

Good article on John Malone's liberty

http://bearofburrardstreet.com/liberty-global-spinoff-lbtyk-get-latin-american-assets-free/

lundi 19 janvier 2015

Book review, The Dao of Capital

I really enjoyed reading The Dao of capital. It's a bit of a slow build up but well worth the time.

Apart from all the austrian wisdom, the two key concepts of the books are The roundabout and hyperbolic discounting.

Those two concept are the reason what I would call time arbitrage works.

The roundabout basically means that it's sometimes better to go right first in order to go left later and is really well visualized as the difference between a roundabout and a four stop. The roundabout is actually much more efficient from a time / energy perspective and it's a good metaphor of scarifying a bit now in order to get a hedge and momentum later (or accepting volatility for higher return).

Now on to hyperbolic discounting.

Basically hyperbolic discounting is the fallacy of thinking you'll have more discipline in the future. Ex I won't study now but tomorrow morning I will wake up early to do so ... People prefer to make a bit of money steadily (procrastination) but are setting themselves up to take a huge loss in the future (failing the exam) instead of paying a little every day in order to set the field for a huge win.

The consequence of those 2 key principles is that investor are looking for immediate yield, and in doing so make some weird investment & capital allocation ex; increasing stock buyback instead of long time investment when the discount rate should be at high time low.

This allow patient and disciplined capital allocator to trounce index long term.

From a strategical point of view the application of the roundabout tactic in Spitznagel investment is via the use of deep out of the money put option on the s&p 500 wich allow him to lose a bit now (the premium) in order to gain a lot in the future by providing liquidity in a time of crisis.

In summary a pretty good book linking austrian economics, value investing, psychology and a good understanding of market risk.

Vincent Thibault


http://daoofcapital.com/

Home market Bias

https://twitter.com/MebFaber/status/557280488210333696/photo/1

mardi 6 janvier 2015

Emerson on principles

“As to methods there may be a million and then some, but principles are few. The man who grasps principles can successfully select his own methods. The man who tries methods, ignoring principles, is sure to have trouble.” -Ralph Waldo Emerson

Nature the It wizard

http://nautil.us/issue/7/waste/nature-the-it-wizard